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Abstract 
The UK’s highly privatised port system means that, while many of the issues in the port 
governance literature relevant to port concessions do not arise here, the respective roles of 
harbour authorities and port operators continue to be questioned. The concern in the UK is 
whose role it should be to monitor the capacity and service quality of the port sector, 
including how to govern the ways in which the different classes of port stakeholder interact. 
 
This paper describes and discusses the UK port sector, the main ports and cargo types, the 
governance system and recent developments. Recent changes in national policy are reviewed 
and potential new developments in governance are considered, reflecting on how the UK case 
represents some key theoretical considerations regarding infrastructure governance within a 
modern political system favouring private ownership and operation of the transport sector. 
 
Key words: UK; port governance; private; trust; container; policy; planning 
 
 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The UK is unusual in its highly privatised port system, with approximately 69% of 
tonnage handled by privately owned and operated ports. The result is that many of the 
discussions in other countries about port concessions do not arise here. Yet the role of 
harbour authorities vis-à-vis port operators and whether and how they should be regulated 
continues to be questioned. The challenge in the UK is to identify shortcomings in the sector 
and decide the best way for port stakeholders (whether government, port operators, port users 
or the wider community) to achieve their goals of a well-functioning and competitive port 
sector to support the economy. 
This paper presents an overview of the UK port sector and outlines the governance 
arrangements, including private, trust and municipal ports. A brief recap on the privatisation 
of much of the UK port sector in the 1980s and 1990s is provided, before moving on to more 
recent developments. A number of recent port expansions are discussed and the changing 
dynamics in the sector are analysed. Current debates in UK port governance are reviewed and 
the paper reflects on the possible governance reforms that could be feasible and the political 
difficulty of achieving them. 
 
2. The UK port system 
The vast majority of ports and harbours in the UK deal with leisure and fishing craft. 
Only 161 ports currently report commercial traffic, with 98% of this traffic being handled by 
those ports classed as major (53 ports) and the remainder handled by minor ports (108 ports). 
Total tonnage handled at UK ports in 2014 was 503.2m tonnes, relatively stable for the last 
few years since the downturn in 2008 (Figure 1).
1
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 Unless otherwise stated, all statistics were sourced from DfT (2015). 
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Figure 1. Total tonnage UK ports 1982-2014 
Source: DfT (2015) 
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Figure 2. UK ports by cargo 2014 
Source: DfT, 2015 
 
The traffic types can be broken down into liquid bulk (38%), dry bulk (25%), RoRo 
(20%), LoLo (12%) and general cargo (4%) and the traffic locations are mapped in Figure 2. 
Liquid bulk remains the dominant category, based on crude oil and oil products, while dry 
bulk is almost 50% coal. The two markets exhibit divergent trends, with crude oil declining 
due to the closure of UK oil refineries and coal imports rising over the last decade, although 
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dropping in 2014 in response to recent changes in demand for biomass fuels in formerly coal-
fired power stations, reflected in the rise of the “other dry bulk” category. Both RoRo and 
LoLo continue to rise. General cargo has declined, mostly due to the decline of forestry 
product imports, while steel has remained stable. Other market segments include support 
work for the offshore oil rigs and, in recent years, renewables such as windfarms and tidal 
energy developments (DfT, 2015).  
Table 1 lists the top 20 port areas by tonnage, accounting for 87% of total UK tonnage. 
The port names used in the table and related statistics are based on the port groupings decided 
by the UK DfT. These are sometimes single ports and sometimes grouped based on rivers and 
harbour areas which may include several different owners and operators. This has 
implications both for the identification of the harbour authority vis-à-vis individual port and 
terminal operators as well as the tonnage figures which sometimes relate to more than one 
port besides the one actually named. The table names the major port owners in each 
grouping, which account for the majority of the tonnage. 
In order to interpret the official statistics, a distinction must be observed between port 
owners (owners of a specific port area and usually operating terminals within the port) and 
non-landowning terminal operators (operating individual terminals or wharves within a port 
area, sometimes under contract or concession from or part of a joint venture with the port 
owner). Since the privatisation processes discussed in section 3.1, in many cases the same 
private company is the harbour authority, port land owner and port operator, but in other 
cases wharves or terminals may be operated by individual companies within an area. This 
simplification is particularly relevant for the Thames and Humber estuaries. For example, the 
Port of London Authority has harbour jurisdiction over many ports on the Thames with 
different owners/operators, such as major container ports Tilbury (Forth Ports) and London 
Gateway (DP World) and smaller ports Purfleet (Cobelfret Group), Dartford (C.RO Ports 
Dartford Ltd) and Dagenham (Stolthaven Terminals). Also, the Port of London Authority’s 
statutory harbour jurisdiction does not extend fully into London Gateway, for which the 
authority is with the port owner and operator DP World. Similarly, in some of Associated 
British Ports’ (ABP) ports on the Humber there are facilities that have been built and 
operated separately by its tenants, sometimes as joint ventures with ABP, sometimes 
independently. Thus, while this paper focuses for the most part on the higher levels of the 
governance hierarchy (e.g. the relationship between the government, harbour authorities and 
major port owners/operators), an important governance question concerns the way operators 
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of small terminal facilities (or those wishing to operate facilities) deal with harbour 
authorities and port landowners (which in many cases are the same organisation). 
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Table 1. Top 20 UK port areas by tonnage, 2014 (million tonnes) 
Port name/ 
grouping 
Definition of the grouping area Port 
ownership 
Harbour 
authority 
Owner of the major port(s) in 
the grouping 
Main cargo types Tonnage 
(million) 
Percent 
of UK 
Grimsby & 
Immingham 
Grimsby and Immingham Harbours, including Killingholme, on south 
side of the River Humber 
Private ABP RoRo, oil products, crude oil, coal 
59.3 11.8 
London 
River Thames between Teddington and the North Sea (excluding the 
River Medway). Includes Tilbury, London Gateway, Purfleet, Dartford 
and Dagenham. 
Private Trust Tilbury (Forth Ports), London 
Gateway (DP World), Purfleet 
(Cobelfret Group), Dartford 
(C.RO Ports Dartford Ltd), 
Dagenham (Stolthaven Terminals) 
Oil products, other dry bulk, containers, RoRo, 
agricultural products, ores, forestry products 
44.5 8.8 
Tees and 
Hartlepool 
River Tees, including Middlesbrough, Billingham and Redcar and 
Hartlepool Harbour 
Private PD Ports Crude oil, coal, ores, iron and steel, oil products, 
other liquid bulk, containers, other dry bulk, 
liquefied gas 39.5 7.9 
Southampton 
Southampton Water and Rivers Itchen and Test, including Fawley and 
Hamble and Southampton Container Terminals 
Private ABP Crude oil, oil products, containers, RoRo, cruise 
36.7 7.3 
Milford 
Haven 
Milford Haven, including Pembroke Dock and Pembroke Port Trust Milford Haven Port Authority Oil products, crude oil, liquefied gas 
34.3 6.8 
Liverpool 
River Mersey eastwards to & excluding Garston & the Manchester 
Ship Canal (includes Seaforth, Bromborough & Tranmere) 
Private Peel Ports Crude oil, RoRo, containers, agricultural products, 
oil products, coal, other dry bulk, ores, passengers 31.0 6.2 
Felixstowe Felixstowe Harbour Private Trust HPH Containers, RoRo 28.1 5.6 
Dover Dover Harbour Trust Dover Harbour Board RoRo, passengers 27.6 5.5 
Forth 
Forth estuary including Houndpoint, Grangemouth, Leith, Rosyth and 
Braefoot 
Private Forth Ports Crude oil, oil products, containers, liquefied gas 
24.6 4.9 
Belfast 
Belfast Harbour Trust Belfast Harbour Commissioners RoRo, coal, other dry bulk, agricultural products, 
oil products, containers, passengers 16.8 3.3 
Clyde 
River Clyde, including Clydeport, Hunterston and Ardrossan, and 
those on Loch Fyne and Loch Long  
Private Peel Ports Coal, crude oil, oil products 
16.2 3.2 
Bristol 
Avonmouth and along River Avon   Private* Bristol Port Company Coal, oil products, other dry bulk, agricultural 
products 11.4 2.3 
Hull 
Hull Harbour on the north side of the River Humber Private ABP Other dry bulk, other liquid bulk, containers, coal, 
forestry products, passengers 10.9 2.2 
Rivers Hull 
and Humber 
River Hull and River Humber, including New Holland and Tetney but 
excluding Hull and Grimsby & Immingham 
Private ABP Crude oil 
10.0 2.0 
Port Talbot Port Talbot Private ABP Ores, coal 9.5 1.9 
Medway 
Rivers Medway & Swale & tributaries, including Sheerness, 
Thamesport, Rochester, Chatham, Ridham Dock & Queenborough 
Private HPH (Thamesport), Peel Ports 
(Sheerness, Chatham) 
Other dry bulk, oil products, forestry products, 
containers 8.5 1.7 
Sullom Voe Sullom Voe Municipal Shetland Islands Council Crude oil 7.2 1.4 
Manchester Manchester Ship Canal Private Peel Ports Oil products, other liquid and dry bulk 7.1 1.4 
Tyne River Tyne, including Newcastle Trust Port of Tyne Authority Coal, other dry bulk 6.7 1.3 
Glensanda Glensanda (aggregate quarry, export only) Private Foster Yeoman Ltd Other dry bulk  6.3 1.3 
Total 436 87 
Source: DfT (2015) 
* Owned by the municipality but the private operator has a 150-year lease so it is effectively privatised 
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The UK container sector handled 9.5m TEU in 2014. The top four container ports 
(Felixstowe - 4.1m TEU, Southampton - 1.9m TEU, London Tilbury - 1.1m TEU and 
Liverpool - 666,000 TEU) have remained stable while Medway Thamesport (which battled 
Liverpool for fourth place for most of the decade) has now declined severely from a peak of 
773,000 TEU in 2008 to only 179,000 TEU in 2014 (Figure 3). The port has now lost its last 
major container service and Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) is looking to redevelop the 
terminal for other cargoes such as steel. The rise of Teesport is the other significant change, 
moving from 15
th
 place in 2000 to 5
th
 in 2014, with 304,000 TEU, but still a long way off 
entering the top four (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 3. UK major container ports 2000-2014, million TEU 
Source: DfT (2015) 
 
Dover in the southeast remains by far the major RoRo port (34%) due to its traffic with 
France, followed by Grimsby and Immingham for other European destinations. Ferry routes 
with Ireland maintain the RoRo traffic with Holyhead and Liverpool while Cairnryan and 
Loch Ryan (opened in 2012 just north of Cairnryan as a replacement for the Stranraer 
service) in southwest Scotland provide RoRo connections with Northern Ireland. Breaking 
down UK traffic by freight and non-freight units, almost half were actually non-freight units, 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
TE
U
 (
m
ill
io
n
s)
 
Felixstowe Southampton London Liverpool Medway
9 
 
including 25% passenger cars and busses and 18% trade vehicles. UK ports also served 
65.9m passengers, the majority 42.7m domestic passengers. Almost half of these were river 
ferries, 18.6m were inter-island ferries, e.g. Isle of Wight and Scotland, and the remainder 
domestic sea crossings e.g. to Northern Ireland, Orkney and Shetland. UK ports also handled 
21.3m international ferry passengers, mostly to France but also Belgium and the Netherlands. 
1.8m cruise passengers were also recorded, mostly for Southampton (DfT, 2015). 
As an island nation, the majority of traffic (80%) at UK ports is international, with 42% 
of major port traffic with EU countries. Feeder movements of containers and transport of oil 
products account for the domestic traffic, while passenger movements between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland also count as domestic. It was estimated that in 2013 the UK port sector 
employed 118,200 people and contributed £7.7bn to the economy (Oxford Economics, 2015). 
 
3. Port governance in the UK 
Due to the devolved political structure in the UK, public responsibility for ports is spread 
across different jurisdictions. All international shipping remains within the purview of the 
UK government, while Scotland and Northern Ireland have responsibility for their own ports. 
The UK government covers ports in both England and Wales, although the Welsh 
government has responsibility for many related issues such as transport and land-use 
planning. Much of the structure and governance of UK ports was already set in place before 
these devolution processes occurred in the late 1990s, therefore the role of government in 
port governance remains quite similar in all jurisdictions. Therefore, references to UK port 
policy can in most cases be taken to refer to all of the UK; while specific policy documents 
are produced for each of the three port jurisdictions (England and Wales, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland), the policy documents for the latter two are general transport policy documents 
without specific port policies. 
There are three types of port in the UK system: private, trust and municipal. Privately 
owned ports tend to be the largest and particularly the container ports. Some of these were 
already private but most were public ports that were privatised in the 1980s and 90s (see next 
section). 15 of the top 20 ports by tonnage in 2014 are privately owned. Trust ports were each 
established by their own Act of Parliament and are therefore subject to specific statutes. 
Being operated by a trust rather than reporting to shareholders, any profit is reinvested in the 
port. There are over 100 trust ports in the UK, but only 20 with an annual turnover exceeding 
£1m (House of Commons, 2013). Municipal ports represent the majority of UK ports, owned 
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and operated by local authorities, and generally focusing on leisure craft although some do 
handle significant amounts of commercial traffic.  
While it was the Conservative government (1979-1997) that conducted the privatisation 
of UK ports, many of the policy documents discussed in the following sections were in fact 
produced by the Labour government (1997-2010), evidence of a relatively unchanged 
government position on the UK port sector across several decades. 
 
3.1 Private ports 
The privatisation of a number of major UK ports in the 1980s and 1990s has been 
reported in detail by previous authors (Thomas, 1994; Baird, 1995; Goss, 1997; Saundry & 
Turnbull, 1997; Baird and Valentine, 2007). There were two processes. First, several major 
ports that had been taken into public ownership at the end of the Second World War under 
the British Transport Docks Board (BTDB) were renamed Associated British Ports (ABP) in 
1982, 49% shares sold in 1983 and the remainder in 1984. ABP remains the largest port 
group in the country, owning 21 ports and accounting for around a quarter of UK tonnage, 
including the ports of Grimsby and Immingham, Hull and Southampton. A number of ferry 
ports (e.g. Stranraer, Holyhead, Harwich) were also sold in the mid-1980s. Second, a number 
of the largest trust ports were sold in the early 1990s. As trust ports are constituted by their 
own Acts of Parliament, new legislation was required which was brought forth as the Ports 
Act 1991 (see next section). 
Not only were the port businesses and land sold in their entirety rather than utilising a 
concession model to bring private operational experience into the sector, there is significant 
evidence that the ports were sold at low prices (Thomas, 1994; Baird, 1995; Goss, 1997; 
Pettit, 2008). Farrell (2013) notes that the management buyout model preferred in most 
instances to share flotation was one reason for both low prices achieved and lack of private 
operator interest. Moreover, unlike a concession model which would involve a port authority 
and a port operator, the privatised port company was in most cases given responsibility for 
the regulatory roles within the harbour, such as providing pilotage and ensuring safe 
navigation. A distinction should be noted between Statutory Harbour Authorities (responsible 
for all vessel movements and protection of the marine environment, including functions such 
as dredging and the provision of navigation aids) and Competent Harbour Authorities 
(responsible only for the provision of pilotage services), yet in most cases they are the same 
organisation. Competent Harbour Authorities were created by the Pilotage Act 1987 and 
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more recently the Marine Navigation Act 2013 included provision to reverse the process and 
remove Competent Harbour Authorities status. This situation could, depending on the size of 
the harbour area and the likelihood of another company seeking to construct port facilities, 
lead to issues of monopoly and anti-competitive practices. Complications have arisen on the 
east coast of Scotland with Forth Ports being the harbour authority for the Forth estuary and 
Babcock needing permission from them for dredging the channel to their own proposed 
container terminal at Rosyth. There is also the issue that, while total capacity may be 
sufficient in the Forth, there has been significant criticism of the quality of the service offered 
at Grangemouth in addition to its restrictions in the size of vessel it can handle. Thus the 
benefits of competition in the Forth might be seen to outweigh the economies of scale from a 
single container terminal. 
It is important to recognise that some ports have been private for many years, such as the 
UK’s busiest container port Felixstowe, opened in 1886 by a local company and since 1991 
owned and operated by HPH. The port of Liverpool was, like the ports discussed in the next 
section, originally a trust port, but in 1971 in order to avoid bankruptcy the Mersey Docks 
and Harbour Board was corporatized as the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (a mixed 
public-private sector company including around 20% UK government shareholding, 
relinquished in 1998 - Baird and Valentine [2007]). In 2005 it was acquired by Peel 
Holdings. Many of the privatised ports have since changed hands again and now there are a 
handful of major port groups operating across the UK. With Felixstowe and Liverpool 
already private beforehand, then the privatised ABP accounting for many major ports, plus 
most of the top trust ports privatised in the 1990s, privately owned ports now account for 
approximately 69% of UK tonnage. 
 
3.2 Trust ports 
A number of key ports in the UK remain administered as trust ports; for example, Dover, 
Milford Haven, Belfast and Aberdeen. As noted above, trust ports constituted the second 
wave of privatisation in the 1990s. The 1991 Act provided two processes for privatising a 
trust port. First, at the request of the port management, and second, directly by the Secretary 
of State, but this can only be done where the port has an annual turnover of over £5m. A 
condition of the process is that the national government receives 50% of the sale price.  
All cases so far except the port of Ipswich have been instigated by the ports themselves. 
Tees and Hartlepool, Clyde, Forth, Medway and London were sold in 1992, followed by 
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Dundee in 1995. Late in the conservative administration, Dover, Tyne and Ipswich were 
directed to begin processes. The Ipswich sale was approved in 1997, and Tyne (which did not 
want to privatise) was cancelled later that year by the incoming Labour government. The port 
of Dover, the UK’s busiest ferry port, handling around 5 million RoRo vehicles and over 13 
million passengers annually, with a turnover of approximately £60 million, had indicated the 
intention to privatise but opposition from port customers and the local community led to 
ongoing wrangling over the form it should take. Therefore, the application was not submitted 
until 2010 and the coalition Conservative-Liberal Democrat government rejected the proposal 
in 2012, based on two primary reasons (House of Commons, 2013). First, insufficient 
community participation, and second, its rationale was for needing funds to expand the 
Western Docks, which it was viewed could be obtained by other means. In 2014 the port 
applied for a Harbour Revision Order (see section 4) to revise the status of the trust in order 
to increase the port’s commercial ability. The minister granted the order which included the 
ability to sell port property, borrow against its assets and pursue joint ventures. The response 
from major customer P&O Ferries was that: “The Minister seems to have reached a 
pragmatic compromise, removing the port’s rationale for privatisation by easing some of the 
financial restrictions that go with its Trust Port status” (Osler, 2014). 
The Labour government published a guide to modernising trust ports in 2000 (DETR, 
2000a) and it was updated in 2009 (DfT, 2009), the latter based partly on a report by 
consultants PwC on the operation of trust ports in 2007. The 2007 interim policy review (see 
next section) stated that “the PwC report concludes that the trust model retains a legitimate 
role within a mixed ports sector. . . . The report also concludes that, while the largest trust 
ports operate on a sound commercial basis, in some cases their financial performance falls 
short of that of their private sector comparators” (DfT, 2007; unpaginated). The Labour 
government, therefore, held a firm view on improving the commercial ability of trust ports 
through strategies other than privatisation: “This Government has stated that it does not wish 
to use its powers under the Ports Act 1991 to force through the privatisation of a port. 
Nevertheless the Department strongly encourages trust ports to analyse their corporate 
structure and keep it under review, with a view to identifying opportunities to enhance their 
efficiency and get value from their assets” (DfT, 2009: 26). In 2011 the new coalition 
Conservative – Liberal Democrat government consulted and then published a note on the 
criteria for deciding on the privatisation of trust ports (DfT, 2011). There were some revisions 
from previous criteria, notably the requirement for community participation, alongside future 
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investment in the port, fair price and fair competition. Employee involvement was also 
desirable but not mandatory. 
 
3.3 Municipal ports 
While the vast majority of municipal ports are small harbours for leisure craft, a few have 
commercial significance, for example the privately operated oil terminals within the 
municipal ports of Sullom Voe and Orkney. The port of Bristol is unique in being technically 
a municipal port but effectively privatised since a private operator purchased a 150-year lease 
in 1991. Unlike trust ports, municipal ports are officially government assets, meaning that 
they are subject to reviews. 
The Labour UK government published guidance for municipal ports in 2006, based on a 
survey of municipal ports in England and Wales (DfT, 2006), recommending that, although 
municipal ports are not trust ports, they could benefit from the recommendations given to 
trust ports regarding greater accountability and better financial management. 
 
4. Policy and planning for UK ports 
Goss (1997) reported on the closure of the National Ports Council (NPC) in 1981, which 
was not necessarily part of a move away from central control as the NPC was considered 
rather ineffectual. This was to some degree an inevitable result of the contradiction between 
central planning while also desiring competition between independent ports. Thus the NPC 
established in 1964 possessed a merely advisory role, with any decision making powers 
retained by the Department for Transport. In any case, the NPC and the DfT could only give 
or withhold permission for a proposed plan, not direct ports to make investments or 
expansions, therefore the national planning function was quite ineffectual and not missed 
when it was removed. Perhaps a more far-reaching outcome of the Harbours Act 1964 was 
the abolition of statutory controls on port dues. While such deregulation can be a major spur 
to industry development (e.g. the Staggers Act in the US rail industry), it remains a problem 
in the UK today that port users must appeal to the minister to challenge what they view as 
unfair port dues. Another significant outcome of this era was the amalgamation of many 
small ports within a single estuary into large trust port authorities, meaning that when these 
trusts were later privatised, they controlled all traffic on their respective rivers. While this 
does not necessarily preclude other (generally small) operators entering the market (see 
discussion of Table 1), the ownership of most port facilities by the incumbent operator and 
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the conflict of interest inherent in their role as harbour authority act as significant barriers to 
entry, thus reducing competition. 
Of greater significance than the sale of many UK ports was the 1989 abolition of the 
National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS), thus ending the restriction of access to port labour to 
those registered in the scheme. It is widely acknowledged that the efficiency increase 
resulting from the abolition of this scheme has been more influential on the improved 
performance of UK ports than the change in ownership model. One of the key factors in the 
rise of Felixstowe was that, as it was too small to be included when the scheme was 
constructed, it was later able to progress towards containerisation without the limitation of 
negotiating with the staffing requirements of the scheme that other ports faced. Policy 
statements reveal that government views its role now as more about regulation of issues such 
as health and safety, giving or withholding planning approval for major developments and 
perhaps the occasional begrudging concession regarding how the public sector can support 
the industry where required, in rare cases involving direct investment. 
Headicar (2009) notes that the UK Conservative government (1979-1997) had very little 
in the way of published transport policy and strategy but they still made significant changes 
to transport governance across the UK, including widespread privatisation of infrastructure 
and operations and centralisation of planning responsibilities. In contrast, the Labour 
government (1997-2010) published many documents with perhaps less clear result. Indeed, it 
was the Labour government that published the first UK port policy document in a generation, 
yet Modern Ports: A UK Policy (DETR, 2000b) simply confirmed the continuation of the 
previous government’s light-touch approach. Despite promising to “support sustainable port 
projects for which there is a clear need, with each looked at in detail on its merits” (p7) and to 
“encourage the use of ports by coastal and short sea shipping services,” (p7) the document 
stated clearly that “it is not the government’s job to run the ports industry” (p5). The 
document also declared that “port infrastructure can and should be commercially financed,” 
(p9) and “we believe that port developments and port operations should not in general need 
public subsidy. Public money is not well spent in distorting competition between ports” 
(p10). One outcome of the document was that in 2003 the DfT published A Project Appraisal 
Framework for Ports (DfT, 2003), which was intended to provide non-statutory but 
nonetheless highly recommended guidance for ports when preparing development proposals 
that would require government approval. Indeed, Pettit (2008: 723) noted that the lack of a 
national policy for strategic port development meant that “in the recent past, it is the 
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development planning system that has had most impact on determining the development of 
UK ports.” 
The successor document, National Policy Statement for Ports (DfT, 2011) was planned 
by the Labour government and the first draft consulted on in 2009-10 but finally published by 
the coalition Conservative – Liberal Democrat government (2010-2015). It to some degree 
developed out of a 2007 interim review of port policy which had recommended that the 
government commission five-yearly demand forecasts, encourage the use of master plans for 
ports handling in excess of 1m tonnes (for which guidance was produced a year later: DfT, 
2008), safeguard port land and safety requirements and continue pursuit of trust port 
modernisation.  
The Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) was a short-lived body created by the 
Labour government in 2009 based on the Planning Act 2008. It set thresholds for nationally 
significant infrastructure projects (NSIP), which would require to be referred to the IPC 
rather than handled directly by the government. These NSIPs could be in several policy areas 
such as transport or energy. The thresholds for ports were cargo throughput of 500,000 TEU, 
250,000 RoRo movements or 5m tonnes of general or bulk cargo. As port developments also 
require marine licenses, the role of the IPC in port projects overlapped to some extent with 
the creation of the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) by the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009, which was given power to grant Harbour Revision Orders (for port 
expansion) and Marine Licences (for dredging). While the IPC was abolished by the 
Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2012 as a result of the Localism 
Act 2011, which returned decision making powers to government, the MMO remains in 
place.  
The idea behind moving decision making powers out of the government was that it would 
speed up the decision making process as lengthy planning inquiries were blamed for the delay 
in approving capacity expansions in the early 2000s as the container market boomed. During 
this period, the UK lost some of its market share to continental ports due to a lack of capacity 
in the southeast of the UK, indicated by a decline in the UK range’s share of European traffic, 
from over 15% in 1996 to around 9% in 2008 (Notteboom, 2010). It was also intended to 
reduce potential for politically motivated intervention, but decisions would nonetheless be 
guided by the outlines in the relevant National Policy Statements produced by government. 
Distinct from the rest of the UK, approvals in Scotland are granted by Transport Scotland 
(Harbour Revision Order) and Marine Scotland (Marine Licenses). The previous planning 
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process, which in many cases entailed lengthy inquiries, received heavy criticism (e.g. Asteris 
and Collins, 2007), yet Southampton’s Dibden Bay development remains the only major 
scheme to have been rejected. 
The 2011 national ports policy statement mentioned above is, therefore, less a ports 
policy and more a document for guiding planning decisions made by the IPC, which, by the 
time the document was published, was already in the process of being disbanded. The 
document has little to say about the operation of current private ports nor the management of 
trust or municipal ports. The document confirms the view that it is not the role of government 
to plan and build ports but simply to approve or reject development proposals and ensure 
ports meet their “legal, environmental and social constraints and objectives” (p11). However, 
it does mention the need “to cater for long-term forecast growth” (p11). The document is 
clear that, while it is the decision of individual ports whether to invest in expansion, the list of 
currently approved expansions would be more than sufficient to cater for projected demand 
“over the next 20 years or so” (p14). While the document contains many pages of guidelines, 
including the need to conform to any existing marine plans, habitat species regulations and 
requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment, it is clear that decision-makers “should start 
with a presumption in favour of granting consent to applications for ports development” 
(p17). Such a major development will also generally involve a public enquiry to hear 
objections and all of this will go into the final application seeking approval by the 
government in the person of the Secretary of State for Transport in the UK for English and 
Welsh ports or the Transport Minister in the case of ports in Scotland or Northern Ireland. 
 
5. Recent port developments 
As shown above, the UK government takes a very light touch approach to port 
governance. Day-to-day port operations as well as investment and expansion are the 
decisions of the individual ports, whether private, trust or municipally owned and operated. In 
order to consider the outcomes of this governance model, some recent developments will be 
discussed in this section. 
 
5.1 New port developments 
Many UK ports have recently completed or are planning major developments, both to 
increase total handling capacity but also to increase depth and crane size to handle the 
increasing size of container vessels. This applies both to the top end of the market but also to 
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the increasing size of feeder vessels, thus giving ports like Teesport a competitive advantage 
over other east coast feeder ports (Wilmsmeier and Monios, 2013). 
The expansion of container capacity at Felixstowe to 5.5m TEU was approved in 2006 
after initial application by HPH and public inquiry in 2004. The first phase, including 730m 
of quay with 16m depth alongside, was completed in 2011 and the 190m extension in 2015 
will allow the port to handle two ultra large container vessels simultaneously. The port has 
also expanded its rail operations by developing a second rail terminal, achieving rail 
throughput of 890,000 TEU in 2014, accounting for a 22% modal share. An additional 
expansion plan of 1.7m TEU by HPH at their neighbouring port at Bathside Bay (Harwich) 
was also approved on a similar timeline, although due to the recession this development was 
never taken forward, and potential challenges to renewing the permission suggest it is 
unlikely to be raised again.  
Southampton’s proposal for a new container terminal at Dibden Bay with a capacity of 
2.3m TEU was rejected in 2004 after a lengthy planning and inquiry process lasting almost 
three years and costing an estimated £45m. The decision was that the significant negative 
impact on the environmentally sensitive areas was not outweighed by the country’s pressing 
need in the early 2000s for increased container handling capacity. More than any of the 
others, the lengthy delay in this process was one of the main catalysts for reforming the 
planning system for major ports. The port has since progressed with development within its 
existing footprint and necessary dredging of the access channel, taking capacity from 2m 
TEU to 2.7m TEU. Permission was initially granted by the MMO in February 2011, but 
subsequent legal challenges by HPH caused delays and the project was finally approved in 
May 2012. 
The entirely new container terminal by P&O (now DP World) at London Gateway on the 
site of an ex-Shell oil refinery on the Thames to the east of London was approved in 2007 
after an initial application in 2002 and public inquiry during 2003. As it is a new port rather 
than an expansion, it required a Harbour Empowerment Order rather than a Harbour Revision 
Order. The port opened in 2014 with a first phase capacity of 1.6m TEU (with a final goal of 
3.5m TEU). The marketing position is that it is best-placed to serve the UK’s largest 
consumption zone (London and the southeast UK) as well as competing with the UK’s 
primary container port Felixstowe for deepsea cargo destined for traditional distribution 
locations in the centre of the country.  
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Besides these developments at the dominant deep sea ports, major port developments 
have also been approved at Liverpool, Teesport and Bristol. Liverpool is currently the fourth 
busiest container port in the UK, receiving deep sea calls from across the Atlantic, but hoping 
eventually to attract Asian links. Its 2014 throughput was 666,000 TEU, and the development 
of a new container terminal is being pursued that would add approximately 600,000 TEU 
capacity to the current limit of around 1m TEU. The new terminal, linked to a dredging of the 
access channel, will be able to handle vessels up to 13,500 TEU, compared to the current 
limit of 3,500 TEU. The project was approved in 2012 after a short consultation with no 
objections, construction commenced in 2013 and the terminal is due to open in 2016.  
Teesport had already upgraded the container terminal in 2003 to a capacity of 235,000 
TEU. The port applied in 2006 for further expansion, and no enquiry was needed due to a 
lack of objections. Approval was given by the government in 2008. The port invested £16.7m 
in expanding the second container terminal, increasing total handling capacity to around 
500,000 TEU by 2011. In 2014 the port handled 304,000 TEU. Further expansion is planned 
in stages, with a long-term target of 1.5m TEU.  
Compared to these ports, Bristol is currently a small container port (106,000 TEU in 
2014), yet £600m is being invested in a new deep-sea container terminal with a capacity of 
1.5m TEU. It went through a public inquiry in 2009 and was approved in 2010. In Scotland, a 
new container terminal has been proposed by Babcocks for the port of Rosyth, aiming 
initially for capacity of 450,000 TEU, and future expansion to 600,000 TEU. The Harbour 
Revision Order for the port development work was approved by the Scottish transport 
minister in 2013 after a public inquiry to hear objections including environmental objections 
from the RSPB and from competitor Forth Ports who operate Grangemouth. Work has not yet 
commenced on the proposed development, as the port also needed to obtain a separate 
Marine Licence to approve dredging the access channel.  
 The trust port of Aberdeen is the centre of supply for the oil rigs. It handled 4.2m tonnes 
of traffic in 2014 including 33,000 TEU of containers, with a turnover of £28.9m. Due to port 
congestion which has seen some of its oil support traffic migrate to Montrose, the port is 
seeking approval for expansion into Nigg Bay with a £410m development. In late 2015 it 
submitted formal applications for a Harbour Revision Order and Marine Licence. The project 
already has Scottish government support as it was included in the third National Planning 
Framework. 
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5.2 Discussion  
The numerous port developments discussed above suggest that not only the larger ports 
but also regional ports expect increased traffic in the coming years. In the past, UK ports 
were considered to be short of capacity, but the danger now is quite the opposite.  
The port of Liverpool is spending £300m to build the Liverpool2 container terminal, in 
order to be able to handle larger container vessels. While their rationale that much of the 
UK’s container demand is closer to Liverpool than to the southeastern ports is sound, it is a 
question of whether the ships will divert from the major trade lanes to serve Liverpool rather 
than the current model whereby vessels traverse the shortest route to northwest Europe and 
the containers then must travel overland from southern UK ports to their destinations. This 
development is linked to other major investment, such as new warehousing, biomass silos 
and an inland port and logistics facility on the Manchester Ship Canal, which would be the 
UK’s only inland waterway container port. A positive indicator for this development is that 
even before the new terminal has been opened, Maersk subsidiary Seago is now linking 
Liverpool with Mediterranean transhipment hub Algeciras, representing the first call by 
Maersk at the port in over a decade. It is also interesting that in 2013 Sefton Borough Council 
received £35m from the UK government’s Regional Growth Fund towards the cost of 
dredging the access channel to 16m. While the grant was officially to the council rather than 
the port, the new terminal is obviously the major beneficiary. The rationale for the use of 
public money for port development was based on the creation of jobs in both the building 
works and from the increase in future traffic. Unsurprisingly, other ports were unhappy with 
what they viewed as a diversion from the UK port policy that stated that ports should fund 
their own development, which indeed raises its own governance issue regarding the 
relationship between investment that is purely for the benefit of port operations and 
investments that benefit the wider public good. If the port land and infrastructure is publicly 
owned then it is easier for the government to make such investment decisions because no 
individual concessionaire would benefit unduly vis-à-vis any other as the quality of both the 
port and connecting infrastructure would be factored into the concession deal.  
The development of Teesport is evidence of a proactive port seeking to expand its feeder 
capacity as well as direct European shortsea traffic, benefiting from the growth of exports 
from countries such as Poland as some elements of manufacturing are “reshoring” from the 
Far East to Eastern Europe. Figure 4 shows the competition between secondary container 
ports in the UK and the success of Teesport. As the port of Grangemouth cannot accept 
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vessels much larger than 1,000 TEU due to depth and lock restrictions, Teesport now has an 
on-dock rail facility with container shuttles to Scotland. As the port can handle vessels up to 
3,500 TEU, it could accommodate some feeder vessels that may cascade down once larger 
vessels enter service on the mainlines (Monios, 2015), making it well-placed to compete for 
feeder cargo across the north of the UK, including Scotland. It is also interesting that the 
Rosyth container port development was included in the Scottish government’s third National 
Planning Framework, though it was watered down from a specific mention of Rosyth in the 
draft document to a less specific “additional container capacity in the Forth” in the final 
version.  
 
 
Figure 4. Throughput at secondary UK container ports, 2000-2014 
 
While UK ports have only an indirect role for the most part in hinterland transport, not 
choosing to invest in inland terminals in the same way that some of their counterparts have in 
mainland Europe (although ABP does own Hams Hall, Birmingham), there is some evidence 
of ports taking a more direct role in terms of logistics. The phrase “port-centric logistics” is 
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heard often in the UK (Mangan et al., 2008; Pettit & Beresford, 2009; Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2012), mostly with regard to Teesport, which has been the market leader in 
terms of port-centric strategy. While it still handles significant non-unitised trade (such as 
steel and chemicals), it has used ex-brownfield land vacated by the decline of traditional 
industries to attract consumer goods to the port. Major retailers Asda (500,000 sq. ft., opened 
2006, 30 year lease) and Tesco (900,000 sq. ft., opened 2009, 125 year lease) opened import-
focused distribution centres (DCs) inside the port for product lines such as clothing and 
electronics, even though their grocery lines remained based in their Midlands DCs. Other 
firms have located DCs inside and in the vicinity of the port; in the latter case, big box 
retailer Argos located near the port, and their carrier changed their port choice from the large 
south-eastern ports in order to reduce land transport costs. Plans for the creation of a further 
1.6m sq. ft. of distribution space are now in place. Some challenges have arisen, however; 
Tesco no longer ships containers through this port, instead bringing containers from the ports 
of Felixstowe and Southampton, which indicates that even with port-centric strategies, 
centralisation tendencies are difficult to overcome. This is partly because Tesco has fewer 
stores in the northeast than Asda so the port-centric strategy was not suitable to their store 
coverage. 
The London Gateway case is interesting because it could be considered to lead to 
overcapacity at a time when demand is weak. Its plans for a 9.25 million sq ft. port centric 
logistics area have also struggled. The key clients for this were Marks & Spencer and 
Uniserve who had each agreed to build a 900,000 sq. ft. DC in the port, but withdrew. The 
port is, however, in talks with other clients and some DCs in the range of 100,000-400,000 
sq. ft. are expected to begin construction soon. While concerns had already existed regarding 
whether the UK required such a level of additional container handling capacity, there also 
appears to be some reluctance for the logistics sector to anchor their distribution activities at 
this location. Yet due to the heavy storms in early 2016, London Gateway was able to handle 
vessels diverted from Felixstowe, thanks to its sheltered upstream location. Indeed, with 
increased frequency of bad weather events expected in future, upstream ports may be able to 
reassert their traditional advantage over more exposed coastal locations favoured in more 
recent times for new deep water terminal developments. 
 In conclusion, the Liverpool case shows that public money is still available for port 
developments in the UK, subject to certain conditions. It also shows that private ports can 
seek to expand to win new traffic rather than merely sweating assets. The attempts by Peel 
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Ports to expand Sheerness and make use of the Manchester ship canal also indicate new 
directions. The Teesport case also indicates substantial appetite for growth, while its success 
against Grangemouth indicates the difference in strategy between a private port with 
competition and a private port with a local monopoly. Because Grangemouth has sufficient 
captive cargo, it is not incentivised to invest in what its management presumably views as 
potentially speculative competition with Teesport, a short-term view which may lead to 
longer term decline. Similarly, Teesport is not investing purely to compete with Grangemouth 
but mostly for competing with closer ports, with the added bonus of making itself attractive 
to cargo currently served by Grangemouth. London Gateway is in some ways indicative of 
overcapacity and their difficulties in securing tenants for the port centric strategy may reflect 
wider trends. But its good location and facilities will likely bear fruit in the longer term.  
The decision on the Dover case is curious because, given the previous privatisation 
programme, it might have been expected that the government would have accepted the port’s 
request to privatise. Part of the refusal decision related to the role of other stakeholders, 
particularly the local community, which had been stridently against the motion. Therefore 
there is some evidence of the community shaping port governance rather than a purely top-
down ideological privatisation drive. 
 
6. Governance issues in the UK port system 
The advantages of greater private sector involvement in ports derive primarily from 
increased efficiency and reduced cost to the public sector. Negative impacts include the loss 
or increased ambiguity of state control as well as the difficulties and risks involved in 
managing the sale or tender process and subsequent monitoring (Baird, 2002). Debrie et al. 
(2013) argued for a deeper contextualisation of port governance models, considering the 
institutional context (relationship between public and private actors and relative decision-
making powers) as well as characteristics of the local market and societal and cultural factors 
impacting on motivations for public intervention. Some of these issues can be identified in 
the above analysis. 
From the national perspective, all UK ports are self-governing, most of the major ports 
being either private or administered by trusts. Ports are responsible for their own planning 
and development, subject to approval for major works as discussed in the previous section. 
Compared to other countries which follow the landlord model and thus retain some influence 
on port management, the role of the government in the UK is necessarily indirect, called to 
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intervene in disputes over unfair charges levied by harbour authorities or to deal with industry 
complaints regarding light dues.  
As with any change in governance, questions are raised regarding the initial aim. If 
privatising is intended to bring in competition, in many cases this was not possible due to 
geographical factors, such as estuary monopolies and single-cargo sites such as oil terminals. 
Full privatisation without restriction on land use also enabled port owners to sell valuable 
assets such as port land and in some cases potentially extract economic rents through their 
combined harbour authority and landowner status. A lack of government oversight on the 
activities and pricing policies of harbour authorities means that an authority can levy a series 
of charges for pilotage, towage, etc. that may or may not be basically economic rent as the 
user has no choice but to pay. This problem is exacerbated in cases where the port operator is 
also the harbour authority. 
While Farrell (2013) argued that the future profitability of ports and in particular the 
future value of their land could not have been foreseen in the early 1990s, similar arguments 
could be applied to many countries which nevertheless opted for a landlord model rather than 
privatisation (Goss, 1997). The fact that, even today, privatisations continue to be 
undervalued suggests either an inability to learn from history or an ideological position in 
favour of low valuations to get the items off the government balance sheet. The privatisation 
of the UK Royal Mail in 2013 was marked by a 38% increase in share price on the first day 
of trading, rising some months later to 87% above the government valuation. By privatising 
ports and retaining little leverage over future directions due to selling off the land in its 
entirety with no conditions as to future operations, it seems more likely that the motivation 
was to remove the assets from the public sector rather than to stimulate new investment or 
competition. The UK case therefore supports the view that the selection of governance model 
is not always related to port performance, and that “while governments may have had the best 
intentions in establishing a more commercialized footing for port operations, the programme 
of reform has not always delivered the full benefits sought” (Brooks & Pallis, 2008: 413). In 
the absence of a comprehensive review of the performance of UK private ports, suggestions 
from some users that not all ports are delivering those performance benefits cannot be 
confirmed or, more importantly, addressed. The Scottish case in particular reveals an 
example of a local monopoly. Similarly, full privatisation means that ports can later be sold 
on, reflecting the trend towards oligopoly in many privatised transport sectors, such as bus 
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and rail in the UK. This is also reflected in the global trend in the port sector towards 
oligopoly in both ports and shipping lines. 
One could argue from a theoretical position that ports obtain much of their ability to earn 
profit from natural endowments thus the country should earn its share of those profits by 
retaining a landlord function, or, to put it another way, to ensure that supernormal profits are 
not earned in the first place, thus providing lower cost services to port users and benefiting 
the country in that way. Using the language of economics, the goal would be to prevent port 
operators extracting economic rents from the inelastic fixed input represented by their 
location (Goss, 1999). It could be possible for the government to levy some kind of windfall 
tax on supernormal profits, but the political acceptability of such a move would be extremely 
challenging, as would the benchmarking process to establish the tax rates. As Goss (1999: 5) 
put it: “Those parties interested in retaining their quasi-rents may attack, or seek to frustrate, 
any objective indicators of efficiency.” 
The opposing ideological position is that it is not the business of government to provide 
transport services. In the UK case it remains something of a moot point as no government is 
going to spend the billions required to purchase the ports back, nor are they going to force 
private operators to become not-for-profit trusts. This would amount to the same as 
purchasing the ports as any transformation to trust status could only be achieved by 
compensating the private shareholders. Even if such moves were undertaken, the next 
government needing funds would sell them again. Nationalisation only happened in response 
to a unique situation, i.e. the aftermath of world war two. It is not going to happen again 
without similar incentive. Renationalising the passenger rail industry, privatised by the 
Conservatives in 1993, enjoys significant popularity with Labour voters, yet the Labour 
government made no moves in this direction throughout 13 years in office, which indicates 
the lack of government appetite across the political spectrum for such a policy.  
Moreover, any discussion of private vs public must consider the scale of public control, 
and recognise the difficulties of national planning for independent locally operated ports. As 
seen in the difficulties of centralised planning experienced by the 1964-1981 National Ports 
Council, many of the privatised ports were actually former trusts, thus never managed at the 
national level. The encouragement in more recent times for all major ports to prepare master 
plans was intended to allow some kind of national monitoring (but not management) of the 
port network, and “assist regional and local planning bodies, and transport network providers, 
in preparing and revising their own development strategies” (DfT, 2008: 4). Other countries 
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such as Italy and Germany are experiencing similar difficulties regarding how to decide at 
national level which ports should get investment when in many cases there is no net benefit to 
the country from several similar expansions for ports competing for the same hinterland. 
 A fact transcending political ideology is that a well performing port industry is in the 
interests of all stakeholders. What the government can do, then, is protect the nation’s 
interests by using regulation to ensure equitable development, good performance and fair 
charging. Baird and Valentine (2007) note that, unlike the other privatised utilities in the UK, 
such as gas and water, there was no equivalent body established to regulate the port industry. 
While the government does say it will respond to complaints, it could be more proactive 
about measuring and managing the process. While government reviews of trust ports (2000, 
2009) and municipal ports (2006) have been undertaken, no similar review has been 
undertaken of the operation of private ports (Baird and Valentine, 2007), although a national 
port forecast was produced by MDS in 2006, and to some degree has been used in deciding 
approvals of major port capacity upgrades. For example, the Dibden Bay development was 
rejected because the large environmental damage was not considered to be offset by the 
addition to national port capacity, as sufficient total capacity was deemed to be coming 
onstream from other already approved developments. Then again, some have criticised this 
approach as it is to some degree subjective by relying on other developments rather than 
judging the individual proposal on its own merits. So, the government can be seen to have 
taken a view on total capacity provision from the national level, although this does not 
include a review of performance.  
Baird (2016) proposes that the government should intervene, estimate how much capacity 
is needed and where, and if it is not being provided then build it (through concession). Using 
a national port regulator to institute performance reviews and penalties would be a better way 
to incentivise new development and expansion. Not only would it improve the performance 
of existing ports, but it would incentivise market entry if an incumbent port is unable to meet 
its performance targets and having to pay fines, etc. and another operator believes that they 
could provide equivalent services for less cost. Planning system reform can be argued to have 
improved the incentives to develop and indeed the sector as a whole faces over capacity, so 
the pressing governance task now is not capacity but performance. 
 
7. Conclusion 
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It is difficult to evaluate the effects of a given port governance model on trade as, once 
the change has been made at a particular port, their unique situations mean that there is no 
longer any control group against which it can be compared. In any case, as long as sufficient 
total port capacity exists then trade in a region will be served. One can argue whether the 
market is providing port capacity in the right places and whether trade is diverted to other 
ports hence incurring increased costs, but new port capacity may not necessarily change this 
situation, depending on a range of influencing factors such as the call choices of shipping 
lines, location of shippers and centralised distribution strategies. If ports are being served and 
trade is flowing and industry complaints are low then government policy makers will 
consider their model endorsed, with little incentive for governance reform. 
Lack of reform incentive is further entrenched once the majority of the sector has been 
privatised, where levers for direct influence are reduced. Therefore, in recent years the role of 
the UK government in the management of ports has been evident mostly through regulation 
of activities, granting or withholding of planning permission for new developments and 
expansions and, in the case of Liverpool, direct investment.  
Would a different model have avoided the under capacity problem in the early 2000s 
which saw the UK lose some market share to continental Europe? Would it have avoided the 
subsequent overcapacity, whereby delayed expansions all came on stream during a recession? 
Governments are not necessarily any better at forecasting future supply needs than the private 
sector (see the MDS forecasts which predicted continuous growth before the recession hit). 
What the government should, however, be able to do is regulate quality of provision. There is 
some evidence that this is not being done, and, while the government says it will respond to 
such issues, it should be more proactive about measuring and managing this issue. 
It remains difficult to provide a definitive answer to the question posed by Brooks and 
Cullinane (2007: 412) regarding “the determination of whether highly prescriptive or loosely 
guided approaches are more effective in generating strong performance.” Certainly neither 
proscriptive nor loose approaches are possible in the absence of the appropriate levers, and it 
is politically difficult to institute them once they have been given up or been unused for long 
periods. What is clear is that competition is necessary to drive investment and improve 
performance, as evidenced by the east coast of England compared to Scotland. Inviting 
private participation is only likely to work if strong incentives exist to innovate and invest, 
i.e. not in natural monopoly situations. While Baird (2013) is correct to criticise the high 
levels of both debt and profits evidenced in the private equity ownership of many UK ports, 
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lack of investment is not always the result. The port development plans discussed in this 
paper (e.g. Liverpool and Teesport) suggest that such operators will invest in the presence of 
appropriate incentives, as also noted by Farrell (2013). 
Public regulation provides minimum standards, although some evidence suggests that this 
model allows operators to play the system to some extent as it is time consuming and 
expensive to follow up and they know that. At a recent inquiry in Scotland, the operator of 
one port said that “at present our customers are very happy with the service that we provide”, 
while one of their customers said “If there were an alternative, we would easily switch to 
someone else straight away” (Infrastructure and Capital Investment Committee, 2015). 
Therefore, while it is easy to say that the current system works, there is clearly a service 
quality issue with no levers to address it, or at least government unwilling to do so. A first 
step might be, as Baird (2016) suggests, to establish a national port regulator to monitor 
performance and ensure the nation’s interests are being served, perhaps extended to include 
not just monitoring of port operational quality but to cover harbour authority functions. 
Expecting public organisations to take responsibility for pursuing proactive port 
development, on the other hand, is likely to prove more challenging. 
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